Aerial intercepts Avoiding Pottential Disaster
The crew of us a US navy EP-3E
Aries II signals intelligence aircraft on a routine mission over the Black Sea
on January 29 had a close call when a Russian Aerospace Forces
— at one point coming within 5ft of the American aircraft and rocking it
with jet wash. The US Navy was so incensed that it
released both footage from the EP-3 and a statement regarding the event. ‘These
videos show the Russian Su-27 intercepting the EP-3 from a very close position,’
said CAPT Bill Ellis. ‘For the Russian fighter aircraft to fly this close to the
US Navy aircraft, especially for extended periods of time, is unsafe.
The smallest lapse of focus or error in airmanship by the intercepting aircrew
Can have disastrous consequences. There
is no margin for error and
insufficient time or space for our aircrews to take corrective action.’
Two months earlier, in the same region, a Russian Su-30 turned on its
afterburners in the path of a US Air Force RC-135 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, violently interrupting its flight path and
forcing it to bank 15°.
insufficient time or space for our aircrews to take corrective action.’
Two months earlier, in the same region, a Russian Su-30 turned on its
afterburners in the path of a US Air Force RC-135 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, violently interrupting its flight path and
forcing it to bank 15°.
Those were not the only recent close calls
between military aircraft in the
skies. On December 13, 2017, a USAF F-22 Raptor ‘head-butted’ two Russian Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ ground attack aircraft over eastern Syria near the Euphrates River, which serves as a deconfliction line established in 2017 to keep the two sides’ aircraft apart. This tactic in military aviation terms refers to traveling in the path of another aircraft and dropping fares or chaff as a warning to back off.
Aerial intercepts involving NATO and Russian aircraft are rather common these days. In 2017, the skies above the Baltic Sea saw 130 intercepts of Russian aircraft by NATO airplanes compared to 110 in 2016, according to the alliance.
skies. On December 13, 2017, a USAF F-22 Raptor ‘head-butted’ two Russian Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ ground attack aircraft over eastern Syria near the Euphrates River, which serves as a deconfliction line established in 2017 to keep the two sides’ aircraft apart. This tactic in military aviation terms refers to traveling in the path of another aircraft and dropping fares or chaff as a warning to back off.
Aerial intercepts involving NATO and Russian aircraft are rather common these days. In 2017, the skies above the Baltic Sea saw 130 intercepts of Russian aircraft by NATO airplanes compared to 110 in 2016, according to the alliance.
High-performance fighters from the
US and Europe regularly rotate in and
out of Baltic air bases as part of NATO’s air policing mission.
In one case during June 2017, a Polish Air Force F-16 intercepted a Russian Tu-154 carrying defense minister Sergei Shoigu as he flew to the heavily militarized exclave of Kaliningrad. An escorting Su-27 flew alongside the Polish fighter and banked onto its side, revealing its
compliment of air-to-air missiles. In the Pacific, Japan Air Self-Defense Force intercepts of Russian aircraft in 2017 at one point outpaced intercepts of Chinese operations in the area. It’s unclear what caused Chinese activities to drop, but an increase in Russian activity is likely due to the deployment of Tu-95MS ‘Bear’ and Tu-22M3 ‘Backfire’ units to the area.
In one case during June 2017, a Polish Air Force F-16 intercepted a Russian Tu-154 carrying defense minister Sergei Shoigu as he flew to the heavily militarized exclave of Kaliningrad. An escorting Su-27 flew alongside the Polish fighter and banked onto its side, revealing its
compliment of air-to-air missiles. In the Pacific, Japan Air Self-Defense Force intercepts of Russian aircraft in 2017 at one point outpaced intercepts of Chinese operations in the area. It’s unclear what caused Chinese activities to drop, but an increase in Russian activity is likely due to the deployment of Tu-95MS ‘Bear’ and Tu-22M3 ‘Backfire’ units to the area.
Avoiding disaster
Fortunately, most aerial intercepts are not hostile or confrontational in nature, according to NATO. In many cases, intercepts come about as a result of innocent error and are conducted safely. The pilots of military aircraft may neglect to file a flight plan, or to switch on the aircraft transponder, or elect not to communicate with air traffic control.
The report on Baltic Air Policing in this issue gives more details of such recent
incidents. ‘Very few are deliberate or provocative,’ NATO chairman Petr Pavel, a
Czech army general, said during a March 7, 2018, briefing in Washington DC regarding
aerial intercepts over the Baltic Sea. ‘All we have [seen] in the region is increased
military presence, more exercises, more flights of [Russian] Long-Range Aviation,
more use of intelligence. But I wouldn’t call
it aggression.’ Nevertheless, mistakes can be dangerous. Human error may have led
to the near-collision between the F-22 and Su-25s over Syria in December. Lt Col
Damien Pickart described the incident to the New York Times as possibly arising from ‘an honest mistake’. The Russian defense ministry alleged that it was the F-22
that acted aggressively, not the Su-25s.
Meanwhile, Pickart rightly warned that the USAF is very concerned about the risks of shooting down Russian aircraft if American pilots interpret their actions ‘as a threat to our air or ground forces’.
In the air, without direct communication and clear rules of behavior, pilots can lose their lives and international incident is a permanent risk. One of the most shocking examples
was the April 1, 2001, Hainan Island incident in which a Chinese J-8 fighter collided with an EP-3 over the South China Sea, which killed the Chinese pilot and forced the American airplane to land in Chinese territory. The collision precipitated an international incident. Once on the ground, China disassembled the EP-3 and seized highly sensitive information.
In most cases, close intercepts are unnecessary, the US Naval War College’s Richard Moss pointed out in a recent edition of Proceedings, an influential American military journal. Sensors aboard modern aircraft are more accurate than
their predecessors, and fighter crews carry high-tech cameras and latest-generation targeting pods that can record suspicious aircraft from farther away than ever before.
What this means is that pilots tend to get close — sometimes too close — in order to make a point, by accident or because the actual rules of how to conduct intercepts are overly broad.
Some 45 years ago, the US and the Soviet Union signed the INCSEA agreement for US-Soviet incidents at sea, which established rules for conduct between ships and aircraft from the two countries. However, the agreement’s few amendments over time have not
Fortunately, most aerial intercepts are not hostile or confrontational in nature, according to NATO. In many cases, intercepts come about as a result of innocent error and are conducted safely. The pilots of military aircraft may neglect to file a flight plan, or to switch on the aircraft transponder, or elect not to communicate with air traffic control.
The report on Baltic Air Policing in this issue gives more details of such recent
incidents. ‘Very few are deliberate or provocative,’ NATO chairman Petr Pavel, a
Czech army general, said during a March 7, 2018, briefing in Washington DC regarding
aerial intercepts over the Baltic Sea. ‘All we have [seen] in the region is increased
military presence, more exercises, more flights of [Russian] Long-Range Aviation,
more use of intelligence. But I wouldn’t call
it aggression.’ Nevertheless, mistakes can be dangerous. Human error may have led
to the near-collision between the F-22 and Su-25s over Syria in December. Lt Col
Damien Pickart described the incident to the New York Times as possibly arising from ‘an honest mistake’. The Russian defense ministry alleged that it was the F-22
that acted aggressively, not the Su-25s.
Meanwhile, Pickart rightly warned that the USAF is very concerned about the risks of shooting down Russian aircraft if American pilots interpret their actions ‘as a threat to our air or ground forces’.
In the air, without direct communication and clear rules of behavior, pilots can lose their lives and international incident is a permanent risk. One of the most shocking examples
was the April 1, 2001, Hainan Island incident in which a Chinese J-8 fighter collided with an EP-3 over the South China Sea, which killed the Chinese pilot and forced the American airplane to land in Chinese territory. The collision precipitated an international incident. Once on the ground, China disassembled the EP-3 and seized highly sensitive information.
In most cases, close intercepts are unnecessary, the US Naval War College’s Richard Moss pointed out in a recent edition of Proceedings, an influential American military journal. Sensors aboard modern aircraft are more accurate than
their predecessors, and fighter crews carry high-tech cameras and latest-generation targeting pods that can record suspicious aircraft from farther away than ever before.
What this means is that pilots tend to get close — sometimes too close — in order to make a point, by accident or because the actual rules of how to conduct intercepts are overly broad.
Some 45 years ago, the US and the Soviet Union signed the INCSEA agreement for US-Soviet incidents at sea, which established rules for conduct between ships and aircraft from the two countries. However, the agreement’s few amendments over time have not
established fixed distances that would keep aircraft at arm’s length from each other. To make matters worse, revising the INCSEA is currently impossible as the US Congress has forbidden joint military co-operation with Russia following the
2014 invasion of Crimea. But establishing firm, fixed distances would help prevent a potentially fatal collision, a shootdown or another international incident.
‘Fixed distances could help avoid ambiguity in situations where the intent of the parties — particularly, with respect to the use of force — cannot be readily identified,’ Moss wrote.
Intent, or the perception of intent, is an extremely important factor for military pilots. An incoming warplane approaching another in a threatening manner puts the
aggressed pilot in a dilemma. The same situation applies to a ship’s captain staring down an incoming attack jet — like the Russian airplanes that have occasionally
buzzed US warships in the Black Sea. ‘Intent can be difficult to gauge in the heat of the moment,’ Moss warns. ‘At what point do deck-level, high-speed passes by attack aircraft become a demonstration of hostile intent?’
Currently, the answer lies with an individual’s interpretation of the situation.
A new set of clear rules would help made disastrous situations less likely.
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